Britain hardens its language as Israel presses ahead with the controversial E1 settlement project
A diplomatic row between Britain and Israel has reopened one of the most difficult questions at the heart of the Middle East conflict: if much of the international community regards Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank as unlawful, what is it actually prepared to do about it? Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband has condemned the Israeli Government’s decision to launch a tender for more than 1,200 homes in the E1 area of the occupied West Bank, describing the move as an “unacceptable and destructive act”. The British Government has also indicated that further measures may follow, including sanctions aimed at those involved in illegal settlement expansion. Israel has responded with unusual sharpness, with Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar accusing Miliband of taking what he described as a patronising and one-sided position and insisting that Jewish people have a right to live throughout what he calls the historic Land of Israel.
The exchange is more than another diplomatic disagreement between two governments. At its centre lies a settlement project which the United Nations believes could fundamentally alter whether an independent and territorially viable Palestinian state remains possible. That gives the dispute a significance far beyond the immediate exchange of words between London and Jerusalem, because it goes directly to the question of whether the long-promised two-state solution still has any realistic territorial foundation.
Why E1 matters
The E1 area lies east of Jerusalem, close to the large Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, and settlement construction there has long been regarded as particularly sensitive because of the geography involved. Development across the area could sever important links between the northern and southern West Bank while further separating occupied East Jerusalem from surrounding Palestinian territory. In practical terms, this is not simply a dispute about another group of houses being built. It is about what happens to the map, how Palestinian communities remain connected to one another, and whether a future Palestinian state could function as a coherent political and economic entity rather than as a patchwork of disconnected enclaves.
The United Nations has warned repeatedly that E1 threatens the geographical continuity required for a viable Palestinian state. The concern is that continued construction around Jerusalem and deeper into the occupied West Bank steadily reshapes facts on the ground, making any future negotiated settlement increasingly difficult to realise. A Palestinian state cannot meaningfully function if its territory becomes an archipelago divided by settlements, military zones, roads and checkpoints. That is why E1 has become symbolically and strategically important far beyond the number of homes planned there.
Settlement expansion and the disappearing two-state solution
For decades the official policy of Britain, the European Union, the United States and much of the international community has been that the conflict should ultimately be resolved through two states, Israel and Palestine, existing alongside one another in peace and security. Yet the physical conditions required to make that possible have steadily deteriorated. Settlement expansion, land seizures, restrictions on movement and the growth of Israeli-controlled infrastructure have all contributed to a situation in which the territory envisioned for a future Palestinian state has become increasingly fragmented.
The United Nations says Israeli policies are increasing control over land, contributing to Palestinian dispossession and displacement and altering the geographic and demographic realities of the occupied West Bank. That does not mean every Israeli policy is identical in purpose or effect, but the cumulative impact is increasingly difficult to ignore. As more settlements are approved and more Palestinian communities face eviction, demolition or restricted access to land, the question becomes not simply whether the two-state solution is politically difficult, but whether it is being made physically impossible.
Concerns have also intensified over the fate of Palestinian Bedouin communities in and around E1, where international bodies have warned of the risk of forcible transfer. Such cases are important because they show how the broader political conflict is experienced on the ground, not as an abstract argument over maps and diplomatic formulas, but through homes, villages, roads, grazing land and access to basic services.
What does international law say?
The legal position adopted by the United Nations is unusually clear. UN Security Council Resolution 2334 states that Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, have no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of international law. The resolution calls upon Israel to cease all settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territory and distinguishes between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967.
The legal argument does not rest solely on resolutions passed at the United Nations. In July 2024, the International Court of Justice delivered an advisory opinion concerning Israel’s policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian territories. The court concluded that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is unlawful and said Israel must cease new settlement activity, while also stating that other states have obligations not to recognise as lawful situations resulting from Israel’s unlawful presence and not to assist in maintaining them. The ruling was an advisory opinion rather than a judgment arising from a dispute between two states, but it nevertheless represents the considered legal view of the United Nations’ principal judicial body and carries significant diplomatic and legal weight.
This distinction matters because international law can identify conduct as unlawful, but it cannot by itself compel a government to change course. Courts do not possess armies, sanctions regimes or police forces of their own. Their judgments and opinions depend on states, international organisations and political institutions being willing to act on them. That gap between law and enforcement is one of the central weaknesses exposed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Israel rejects the international consensus
Israel has consistently disputed much of the international legal and political framework surrounding the settlements. Israeli governments have argued that Jewish connections to Judea and Samaria, the biblical terminology commonly used in Israel for the West Bank, stretch back thousands of years and that the territory should not be treated simply as foreign land under occupation. Israel has also maintained that questions of borders, settlements and sovereignty should ultimately be resolved through direct negotiations rather than imposed externally by international institutions.
Security forms another central element of Israel’s case. Israeli governments point to decades of attacks against Israeli civilians, armed groups operating from Palestinian territories and the trauma of the October 7 Hamas attacks as evidence that relinquishing territorial control without robust security guarantees could expose Israel to further violence. From this perspective, international criticism can appear selective, particularly when Israeli officials believe insufficient attention is paid to Hamas, Palestinian armed groups or incitement against Israel.
Sa’ar’s rebuke to Miliband reflects this wider argument. His position is essentially that Britain is applying international pressure against Israel while failing to recognise adequately Israel’s historical claims, security concerns and experience of terrorism. For supporters of Israeli settlement policy, international condemnation can therefore appear less like neutral enforcement of law and more like an attempt to decide contested territorial questions before negotiations have taken place. Yet that interpretation sits in direct conflict with the position taken by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, which regard the settlements as unlawful under international law.
Britain moves from condemnation towards sanctions
For years, successive British governments have condemned settlement construction while maintaining close political, diplomatic and security ties with Israel. That has produced an increasingly awkward contradiction. If Britain genuinely believes settlements are illegal and damaging to the prospects for peace, at what point does repeated condemnation without meaningful consequences become politically hollow?
Miliband now appears to be testing that boundary. The Foreign Secretary has indicated that Britain is preparing additional measures against individuals involved in settlement expansion, which would move British policy beyond verbal criticism and towards the imposition of direct consequences. Such measures would still fall well short of comprehensive sanctions against Israel itself, but they would represent a significant shift in emphasis. The question is no longer simply whether Britain disapproves of settlement expansion; it is whether Britain is prepared to attach a tangible political or financial cost to policies it regards as unlawful.
That distinction could become important well beyond this single dispute. Britain frequently invokes the concept of a rules-based international order in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, territorial sovereignty and other conflicts around the world. The credibility of that argument depends in part on whether the same principles are applied consistently when the government involved is an ally or strategic partner rather than an adversary.
The uncomfortable question of enforcement
This exposes one of the most obvious weaknesses of the international system. The rules are extensive, the institutions are numerous and the legal findings are often detailed, but the enforcement mechanisms remain heavily dependent on political will. The United Nations can pass resolutions, courts can issue judgments and advisory opinions, and governments can condemn violations, but international law ultimately relies on states being prepared to enforce the standards they claim to support.
Governments possess a range of tools, including economic sanctions, restrictions on financial transactions, diplomatic measures, arms export controls and travel bans. They can also distinguish between trade with Israel itself and economic activity linked to settlements in occupied territory. Yet the difficulty is political rather than legal. Measures against Israel remain deeply controversial among Western governments, not least because Israel is an important strategic partner of the United States and several European countries.
The United States in particular possesses enormous influence. Washington provides substantial military and diplomatic support to Israel and holds a veto as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Without American support, attempts to impose binding international measures through the Security Council face formidable obstacles. This creates a recurring tension in which international law may be clearly stated while political realities prevent that law from being effectively enforced.
Gaza and the West Bank cannot be treated as identical
The war in Gaza and settlement expansion in the West Bank are connected through the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but they raise different legal and political questions and should not be collapsed into one argument. In Gaza, the immediate issues include the conduct of the war, civilian casualties, humanitarian access, the release of Israeli hostages, the future role of Hamas and the conditions for Israeli military withdrawal. The West Bank involves occupation, settlement expansion, land ownership, settler violence, military control and the territorial integrity of any future Palestinian state.
Combining these questions too casually can obscure rather than illuminate the situation, but together they reveal the scale of the crisis confronting advocates of a negotiated settlement. If Gaza remains devastated by war while the West Bank becomes increasingly fragmented through settlement expansion, the physical and political foundations required for a future Palestinian state may continue to disappear. The issue is therefore not only whether the current war can be ended, but whether the territorial conditions for any lasting political settlement are being eroded at the same time.
Can anyone stop the conflict?
The grim reality is that several governments and international institutions possess considerable leverage, but no single actor can simply impose peace. The United States remains the outside power with the greatest direct influence over the Israeli Government, while Britain and European governments can increase diplomatic and economic pressure. The United Nations can document violations and provide an international legal framework, while Egypt and Qatar retain important roles in negotiations involving Hamas and Israel. International courts can determine legal responsibilities and increase political pressure on governments.
Yet none of these mechanisms automatically produces compliance. Peace ultimately requires political decisions by Israelis and Palestinians themselves, backed by sustained pressure, guarantees and incentives from outside powers. That has proved extraordinarily difficult because the parties do not merely disagree about borders or security arrangements; they disagree about history, legitimacy, sovereignty, justice, refugees, Jerusalem and the character of any future Palestinian state.
This is why repeated declarations that the two-state solution remains the only viable outcome increasingly sound detached from the reality developing on the ground. Every new settlement, demolition, forced displacement or military escalation makes the political route towards two states more difficult, and yet the international community continues to invoke that solution as though it were permanently available.
The wider test for Britain
Miliband’s confrontation with the Israeli Government therefore raises a question extending far beyond one settlement project. Britain repeatedly speaks of a rules-based international order, invokes international law in Ukraine and elsewhere, and argues that territorial conquest and unlawful occupation cannot simply be accepted because they have become politically inconvenient to challenge. The credibility of that position depends upon whether Britain applies those principles consistently.
Israel argues that Britain’s approach ignores the security threats Israelis face and prejudges territorial questions that should be settled through negotiation. Palestinians and their supporters counter that negotiations cannot remain meaningful while the territory supposedly being negotiated over is steadily transformed on the ground. Between those competing arguments stands the central fact that the United Nations continues to regard Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory as unlawful.
Miliband has now moved Britain’s rhetoric one step closer to action. Whether sanctions follow, how extensive they become and whether other governments move in the same direction will determine whether this represents a genuine change in British policy or another episode of diplomatic condemnation.
For decades, Britain and other governments have repeated that settlement expansion threatens the two-state solution. The question confronting them now is increasingly stark. If the two-state solution is allowed to become geographically impossible, there may eventually be nothing left to negotiate. And if governments insist that international law must be respected but repeatedly decline to enforce it, the danger reaches beyond Israel and Palestine.
It raises a much larger question about the international order itself: whether international law can meaningfully restrain states when it matters, or whether it merely records the rules governments have already chosen to ignore.
