A new American-backed proposal could offer one of the clearest routes yet towards ending the conflict in Gaza, but fundamental differences between Israel and Hamas remain unresolved, while the agreement does not automatically extend to Israel’s continuing confrontation with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Donald Trump has announced what he describes as a major breakthrough in efforts to bring the Gaza conflict towards an end, declaring that his international “Board of Peace” has reached an agreement covering the disarmament of Hamas and other armed organisations within the territory.
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The announcement, made on Thursday 30 July, immediately raised hopes that a conflict which has devastated Gaza and destabilised much of the Middle East might finally be approaching another decisive diplomatic moment. Yet beneath the triumphant language lies a far more complicated negotiation.
The agreement is potentially significant. It is not, however, the same thing as a completed peace treaty between Israel and Hamas.
At the centre of the proposal is a phased process under which Hamas and other armed factions would surrender or decommission their weapons while Israeli forces progressively withdraw from Gaza. An internationally backed security force would help supervise the process, while a new Palestinian administration would increasingly assume responsibility for governing the territory.
That framework has been developing for months rather than appearing suddenly from a presidential social-media account. Trump’s Board of Peace forms part of the wider American-backed plan for Gaza which was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations Security Council.
Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted in November 2025, recognised the Board of Peace as part of a transitional structure for Gaza and authorised the establishment of an International Stabilization Force. The resolution envisaged the eventual demilitarisation of Gaza alongside a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces.
The Board therefore possesses considerably more diplomatic substance than its unusual name might initially suggest.
Its structure brings together a coalition of governments and international figures, with Trump serving as chairman. The organisation is intended to coordinate security, reconstruction and a transition away from Hamas rule towards a Palestinian technocratic administration.
There has already been movement from Israel. On 26 July the Israeli security cabinet approved in principle the limited entry of an International Stabilization Force into Gaza, initially connected with a proposed humanitarian and reconstruction project around Rafah.
That decision matters because it demonstrates that Israel has accepted at least important elements of the wider framework.
But it does not mean Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has accepted the latest agreement in precisely the form proclaimed by Trump.
The Dispute That Could Still Break the Agreement
The central obstacle is remarkably simple to describe and exceptionally difficult to resolve.
Hamas wants Israeli forces to withdraw before it completes the process of relinquishing its weapons.
Israel wants Hamas to disarm before Israeli forces complete their withdrawal.
Each side therefore wants the other to move first.
Hamas official Ghazi Hamad has said implementation depends upon Israel honouring commitments associated with the previous peace framework, including ending military operations, withdrawing forces and increasing the flow of humanitarian assistance.
Hamas has indicated that weapons could be placed under the authority of the new Palestinian administrative structure, but its language has been noticeably more cautious than Trump’s declaration of complete disarmament.
Israel’s position points in the opposite direction. Israeli officials continue to insist that military withdrawal cannot take place until Hamas has been demonstrably and verifiably disarmed.
It is here that Trump’s announcement requires careful qualification.
There appears to be an agreement or proposed roadmap negotiated through mediators, and there appears to have been significant progress in discussions with Hamas. But the final sequence of Israeli withdrawal and Hamas disarmament remains contested.
That difference is not diplomatic small print. It is the hinge upon which the entire arrangement turns.
Could Netanyahu Agree?
There are reasons to believe that Israel may ultimately accept a negotiated version of the proposal.
Israel is itself participating in the broader Board of Peace structure and its security cabinet has already authorised limited participation by the international stabilisation force envisaged under the plan.
Netanyahu also has an unusually important political relationship with Trump. Washington remains Israel’s indispensable military and diplomatic partner, meaning an Israeli government cannot casually dismiss a major American initiative.
Trump may therefore possess greater leverage over Netanyahu than many previous mediators.
But Netanyahu faces pressures of his own. Israeli security officials and members of the country’s political right have consistently demanded the complete destruction or disarmament of Hamas’s military capabilities.
For Netanyahu to accept a withdrawal while substantial Hamas weaponry remained intact would leave him vulnerable to accusations inside Israel that the objectives of the war had not been achieved.
The most probable compromise is therefore not an instantaneous ceasefire followed by an equally rapid Israeli withdrawal. It is a carefully monitored sequence in which Hamas progressively surrenders weapons while Israeli forces progressively leave corresponding areas.
An international force would then move into those areas, allowing neither Hamas nor the Israeli military to fill the security vacuum.
Conceptually, it is straightforward. On the ground, amid ruins, destroyed infrastructure, competing armed organisations and extraordinary levels of mistrust, it would be enormously difficult.
What About Lebanon?
There is another important distinction which risks becoming blurred amid the optimism surrounding Trump’s announcement.
The Gaza agreement does not constitute an Israeli ceasefire with Lebanon.
Israel’s confrontation with Hezbollah is governed by a separate diplomatic process.
The United States has also been attempting to broker arrangements in southern Lebanon under which Hezbollah would progressively relinquish military control while Israeli forces withdraw from occupied positions.
Pilot areas have been proposed as part of that process, but implementation has proved painfully difficult. Hezbollah has resisted demands for comprehensive disarmament, while Israel insists that it must retain the ability to strike forces which it considers an immediate threat.
Consequently, even successful implementation of Trump’s Gaza initiative would not automatically end Israeli air attacks or military operations in Lebanon.
Ending one conflict may improve the political atmosphere surrounding the other, particularly because Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran form interconnected parts of the regional strategic equation. But legally and diplomatically they remain separate negotiations.
Trump’s Claim: True, False or Somewhere Between?
Trump’s announcement cannot fairly be dismissed as false.
There has been significant diplomatic progress. Negotiations have taken place. A framework for Hamas disarmament exists. International mechanisms capable of supervising that process are being assembled, and Israel has already approved elements of the stabilisation plan.
But the president’s characteristically emphatic language gives the impression that a finished agreement has been secured and merely awaits implementation.
That is not yet the position.
Hamas and Israel remain divided over perhaps the most important question of all: who acts first?
The difference between those positions could prove bridgeable. International peace agreements frequently depend upon precisely this sort of carefully synchronised exchange.
Weapons could be surrendered under international supervision at the same time as Israeli troops withdraw from agreed sectors. Neither party would therefore be required simply to trust the other’s promise.
Whether Netanyahu will ultimately accept such an arrangement remains uncertain.
But Israel’s previous acceptance of the broader Trump framework and its recent approval of the International Stabilization Force suggest that the proposal cannot simply be dismissed as diplomatic theatre.
There is something real taking shape.
The danger lies in mistaking its foundations for the finished building.
A Moment of Possibility, Not Yet Peace
For the people living inside Gaza, the distinction is painfully tangible.
Diplomatic communiqués may speak about roadmaps, milestones, demilitarisation and transitional administrations, while families continue to experience the consequences of military operations on the ground.
That is why the coming days matter more than the declarations of Thursday night.
If Hamas begins verifiable disarmament, if Israel begins corresponding withdrawals, if the international stabilisation force moves into Gaza and if humanitarian assistance expands substantially, historians may eventually look upon Trump’s announcement as the moment an apparently endless conflict finally began moving towards its conclusion.
But if Israel and Hamas remain locked over which side must move first, Thursday’s declaration will join the long archive of Middle Eastern peace initiatives that promised considerably more than they ultimately delivered.
For now, the most accurate description is neither triumph nor failure.
It is an opportunity.
And in a region that has endured years of war, grief and retaliation, an opportunity for peace is precious enough without pretending that peace has already arrived.
