The world was spared a potential nuclear catastrophe on September 26, 1983.
Early-warning systems in the Soviet Union identified an impending missile strike from the United States in the very early hours of the morning. Computer readouts indicated that multiple missiles had been fired. The Soviet military would have been expected to respond with a nuclear strike of its own.
However, duty officer Stanislav Petrov, whose responsibility it was to document suspected enemy missile launches, chose to ignore them and write them off as a false alarm rather than reporting them to his superiors.
This was a duty neglect and a violation of his instructions. Referring upward and assigning the responsibility would have been the prudent course of action.
However, his choice might have saved humanity.
“I had all the information to indicate that a missile strike was still in progress. Thirty years after that overnight shift, he told the BBC’s Russian Service, “Nobody would have said a word against it if I had sent my report up the chain of command.”
Mr. Petrov was a member of a well-trained squad that served at one of the Soviet Union’s early warning bases, not far from Moscow. He retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel and currently resides in a small town close to Moscow. His directions were very clear, and his training was intense.
“I couldn’t move.”
His responsibility was to document any missile attacks and notify the political and military authorities in the Soviet Union. Under the political circumstances of 1983, a counterattack would have been highly likely.
Nevertheless, he claims that he nearly froze in place when the time arrived.
“The siren howled, but I just sat there for a few seconds, staring at the big, back-lit, red screen with the word ‘launch’ on it,” he continues.
He was being informed by the system that the alert’s dependability was at its “highest” level. There could be no uncertainty. The United States had fired a missile.
“The siren went off once more a minute later. They fired off the second missile. Then came the third, fourth, and fifth. The notifications from computers read “missile strike” instead of “launch,” the man said.
Mr. Petrov describes the events that must have replayed in his head innumerable times while puffing on cheap Russian cigarettes.
“There was no guideline dictating how long we had to consider before reporting a strike. However, we were aware that every second of delay cost us precious time, and that the political and military leadership of the Soviet Union needed to be notified right away.
“All I needed to do was grab the phone to establish a direct line of communication with our top commanders, but I was immobile. He said, “It felt like I was sitting on a hot frying pan.”
Moscow, 1989: Soviet missiles on show
Image caption: According to Soviet protocol, the armed forces ought to launch their own nuclear attack in retaliation.
Mr Petrov was not entirely convinced, even though the alert’s nature appeared to be quite obvious.
He and other IT specialists were not the only experts in the Soviet Union keeping an eye on US missile weapons. He was informed by a group of satellite radar operators that no missiles had been detected.
However, those folks were merely a source of assistance. The policy made it very clear that computer readouts would have to be the basis for the decision. And it was up to him, the duty officer, to make that choice.
However, what really set him on edge was how powerful and distinct that warning was.
There were perhaps 28 or 29 tiers of security. The target needed to clear each of those “checkpoints” after it was located. Under those circumstances, I wasn’t entirely sure it was conceivable,” the retired officer says.
Mr. Petrov reported a system failure to the duty officer at the Soviet army’s headquarters.
The first nuclear blasts would have occurred minutes later if he had been mistaken.
“After 23 minutes, I recognised that nothing had occurred. I would have been informed of any actual strike by now. He smiles and says, “It was such a relief.
“I’m glad it was me.”
Thirty years later, Mr. Petrov believes the chances were equal. He acknowledges that he was never quite certain the notice was a hoax.
He claims that out of all the officers on his team, only he had a civilian education. “My colleagues were all professional soldiers, they were taught to give and obey orders,” he stated to us.
He therefore thinks that the alarm would have gone off if someone else had been working the shift.
A few days later, Mr. Petrov was formally chastised for the events of that evening. Errors in the logbook, not for anything he did. He said nothing for ten years. “I thought it was shameful for the Soviet army that our system failed in this way,” he continues.
However, the narrative did make it into the media following the fall of the Soviet Union. Mr. Petrov was honoured with multiple international honours. However, he does not consider himself to be a hero. He responds, “That was my job.” “But they were lucky it was me on shift that night.”
